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Misconceptions and confusion abound in political discourse, aca-
demic literature, and the media regarding redistribution in the federal
income tax system. This is particularly true of recently proposed tax
changes. Concern about the re-distributional impact of some of the
new tax proposals has sparked debate and criticism about the equity
and effectiveness of tax law and its underlying policies. Critics and
pundits often use vague notions of redistribution regarding a particu-
lar provision as a basis for determining the fairness and effectiveness
of the tax system. However, such assessments are usually limited to
quick sound bites and catchy phrases rather than a comprehensive
analysis of tax law and the special programs it supports. The former
method is seriously flawed and misleading, as it arbitrarily evaluates
the impact of a single tax provision without considering the tax system
historically and holistically. Furthermore, because such tactics are fre-
quently designed to elicit "knee jerk" reactions rather than careful
and thoughtful consideration, they are distracting from a meaningful
discussion of real issues and solutions regarding the tax system. Thus,
it is not uncommon for the success or failure of certain tax proposals
to be unduly influenced by distorted perceptions of re-distributional
consequences.
This has been the case for many of the recent proposals that give
low and moderate-income taxpayers tax cuts, college loans, and a uni-
versal health care system.' As a means of paying for the new pro-
grams, the proposals also call for increasing the tax burdens of high-
1. See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 1 (2009), http://www.treasury.
gov/offices/tax-policy/library/grnbkO9.pdf [hereinafter Green Book] (proposing to make perma-
nent the "Making Work Pay" 6.2% refundable tax credit phased-out at 1.6% for taxpayers with
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) over $75,000 and $150,000 for joint filers); id. at 2-3 (expanding
eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit); id. at 4-5 (expanding the refundability of the child
tax credit for low and middle income earners); id. at 10-11 (replacing the Hope Credit with the
American Opportunity Tax Credit, which provides a partially refundable tax credit covering the
first four years of post-secondary education and phasing out "for taxpayers with adjusted gross
income between $80,000 and $90,000 . . . $160,000 and $180,000 if married filing jointly."); see
also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 61 (2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/USbudget/fyl0/pdflfyl0-newera.pdf (expanding Pell Grants and tying their increase to infla-
tion as well as proposing ways of stabilizing low-cost direct federal loans for undergraduate and
graduate level education); The Obama Plan: Stability & Security for All Americans, http:/www.
whitehouse.gov/issues/health-care/plan (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (providing tax credits to help
low and middle class taxpayers purchase insurance).
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income taxpayers.2 Although the charges made by some critics that
the proposed changes create "class warfare," excessively burden the
wealthy, and are "socialist" in design may have significant rhetorical
flare, they lack normative substance and essential context.3
Despite the recent focus on redistribution, it is not a new concept
in tax policy. Throughout its history, the tax system has been used as
a means of wealth redistribution.' Furthermore, contrary to popular
perception, more often than not redistribution has occurred from low
to high-income taxpayers rather than the other way around.' This is
especially true of the major asset building programs advanced through
the tax system. Historically, asset-building programs that encourage
activities such as retirement savings, home ownership, and various
forms of investment have benefited high-income taxpayers and given
very little benefit to low-income taxpayers.6 However, the public pays
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 9015 (2009)
(adding to FICA's Hospital Tax, 26 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (2004), a 0.5% tax on all wages for taxpay-
ers filing a joint return showing over $250,000 in adjusted gross income or $200,000 on other
returns); Affordable Healthcare for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 551 (2009) (provid-
ing for the addition of §59C to the Internal Revenue Code, which would impose "a tax equal to
5.4% of so much of the modified adjusted gross income of the [taxpayers filing jointly] as ex-
ceeds $1,000,000," or $500,000 for a taxpayer filing individually); see also H.R. 3590, supra, at
§ 9001 (providing for a 40% excise tax on the value of health benefits in excess of $8,500 for
individual coverage and $23,000 for spouse or family coverage. Presumably, such "Cadillac"
plans are only provided to highly compensated individuals); Green Book, supra note 1, at 73
(proposing to reinstate the 39.6% tax rate for income exceeding $372,950, indexed for inflation);
id. at 74-77 (proposing to reinstate the 36% tax rate, limiting itemized deductions; reinstate the
personal exemption phase-out; and impose a 20% tax rate on dividends and capital gains for
individual taxpayers making $200,000, and imposing the same for married taxpayers who file
jointly with income over $250,000).
3. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, In Obama Tax Plan, A Shift of Wealth from the Top Down,
WASH. POST., Mar. 7, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/03/06/AR2009030603367.html.
4. See Ajay K. Mehrotra, "Render Unto Casear . Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the
Historical Underpinnings of the Modern American Tax System, 40 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (2009)
(exploring the religious and ethical reasons driving the growth of a progressive tax system and
social-policy based spendinglexpenditures in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first
centuries).
5. See Jeff Kolnick & Doug Anderson, Examining "Redistribution of Wealth", NAT'L
VOTER, Feb. 2009, at 6, available at http://www.lwv.org/AMlTemplate.cfm?Section=Curent
Issues&ContentId=12682&Template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm; Warren Buffett and NBC's Tom
Brokaw: The Complete Interview (NBC Nightly News television broadcast Oct. 31, 2007), availa-
ble at www.cnbc.com/id/21553857 (providing an excellent anecdotal explanation of how payroll
and income taxes work together to ensure that the super-wealthy pay a significantly smaller
percentage of their total income to the federal government than almost any other category of
earner).
6. CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIoirr: A LOOK AT THE $335 BILLION FED-
ERAL ASSET-BUILDING BUDGET 12-13 (2004), http://cfed.org/assets/documents/publications/
Hidden%20in%20Plain%2OSight%20Summary.pdf (reviewing tax expenditure data for home
ownership, retirement accounts, savings and investments, and small business development, the
CFED study found that the average benefit to a taxpayer with income in the top 1% is $38,107,
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relatively little attention to the distributional impact of these
programs.
A recent study commissioned by the Federal Reserve System an-
alyzing the largest of these asset building programs for fiscal year 2005
showed that over 45% of the benefits derived from these initiatives
went to taxpayers with incomes over $1 million.' The average annual
benefit received by these individuals was $169,150.8 Not surprisingly,
many of these tax policies have had, and continue to have, a profound
and cumulative effect on the growth of individual wealth in this coun-
try.9 Although all taxpayers, including the least wealthy, subsidize the
preferential tax treatment of the savings initiatives by paying higher
taxes on the portions of their incomes that do not receive special tax
treatment, not all taxpayers receive commensurate levels of benefits
from such programs.1 o Therefore, any serious discussion of the distri-
butional aspects of the tax system should consider the impact of one
or all of these special initiatives. Even if some of the recent proposals
do, to some extent, redistribute income from the rich to the poor, they
do very little to offset the regressive effect of these long standing
programs.
Unquestionably, encouraging savings and investment is sound tax
policy because increased wealth strengthens both the individual and
society. To achieve greater equity and effectiveness with respect to
these programs and justify their enormous costs, however, the tax in-
centives for asset ownership should be structured broadly enough to
benefit both rich and poor taxpayers. With this objective in mind, it
would seem that the new proposals of the current Administration,
which is seven times the average benefit of the next 4% of the population; 12 times the average
benefit of the next 5% after that; 220 times the average benefit of the middle 20%; and 8,985
times the average benefit of the bottom 20%, who receive, on average, a benefit of $4).
7. LILLIAN Woo & DAVID BUCHHOLZ, SUBSIDIES FOR ASSETs: A NEw LOOK AT THE
FEDERAL BUDGET 1 (2007) [hereinafter Woo & BUCHHOLZ], available at http://community-
wealth.com/_pdfs/articles-publications/individuals/paper-woo-bucholzO7.pdf ("This report was
commissioned as part of the Federal Reserve System/CFED Research Forum on Asset-Building,
and first presented at the 2006 Asset Learning Conference in Phoenix, Arizona.").
8. Id.
9. See Kolnick & Anderson, supra note 5.
10. See Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act, H.R. 1215, 104th Cong. (1995); see Joseph
S. Coyle, How to Beat the Squeeze on the Middle Class You Will Have to Work Longer, Harder,
and Smarter. But Follow Our Advice and You Can Move Ahead, MONEY MAG., May 1, 1995, at
106, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag-archive/1995/05/01/202
720/index.htm (explaining that individual savings rates among the lower- and middle-income
taxpayers are in decline); see also AARP, AGING BABY BOOMERs: How SECURE Is THEIR Eco-
NOMic FUTURE? 4 (1994) (providing that accumulated savings of the middle class is so low that it
will likely not keep pace with projected future needs).
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rather than going too far, do not go far enough to reduce overall
regressivity in the tax law.
This article evaluates the distributional impact of recent trends in
the private retirement system-the largest of the asset building pro-
grams"-in order to give greater context to the ongoing discussion of
redistribution in the tax programs and to recommend policy changes
to achieve greater equity in the private retirement system. Evaluating
one of the nation's largest and most expensive tax expenditure pro-
grams will show not only where the assets are spent and who currently
benefits from them, but also how resources should be redirected to
better accomplish the objectives of the program.
Specifically, Part I describes the role of tax expenditures in the
tax law and analyzes their use in connection with the private retire-
ment system. Part II then demonstrates how and the extent to which
existing retirement policies disproportionately benefit the wealthiest
taxpayers and provides insufficient protection to low and moderate-
income taxpayers against the risk of losses in popular forms of retire-
ment savings plans.12 Finally, Part III recommends modifications to
the tax law that expand the retirement program to benefit a greater
number of low and moderate-income taxpayers at each stage of the
retirement savings process, in order to achieve greater equity and ef-
fectiveness in the tax system in general, and the private retirement
system in particular.
I. FEDERAL INCOME TAX POLICY
American tax law contains numerous financial assistance pro-
grams that are designed to encourage activities consistent with certain
public policy objectives and to relieve various forms of personal hard-
11. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
12. These policies have disparate impact with respect to gender and race, as well. Despite
their value to a discussion on retirement equity, gender and racial inequalities regarding the
impact of tax incentives for retirement plans are beyond the scope of this article. However, for
interesting scholarship specifically addressing these matters, see ARIEL EDUC. INITIATIVE &
HEwrrr ASSOCIATES, 401(K) PLANS IN LIVING COLOR: A STUDY OF 401(K) SAVINGS DISPARI-
TIES ACRoss RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2009), http://www.hewittassociates.com/
MetaBasicCMAssetCache_/Assets/Articles/2009/arielhewitt 401kstudy-results.pdf; Ruth
Helman, Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, Minority Workers Remain Confident About Retire-
ment, Despite Lagging Preparations and False Expectations, 306 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (2007), avail-
able at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRIIB_06-20079.pdf; SUNWHA LEE & LolS SHAW,
GENDER AND ECONoMIC SECURITY IN RETIREMENT (Inst. for Women's Policy Research 2003),
available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdflD456.pdf.; ANNIKA E. SUNDEN & BRIAN J. SURETTE, GEN-
DER DIFFERENCES IN THE ALLOCATION OF ASSETS IN RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLANS (Fed. Re-
serve Bd. 1998), http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBSloss/oss2/papers/gender.pdf.
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ship." These provisions represent a set of societal beliefs that some
activities are so important that they warrant public subsidies.' 4
Rather than offering the subsidies through a single comprehensive
system, however, they are provided through a vast and varied assort-
ment of special programs. Some of the special programs are funded
by direct payments from the federal government, such as grants, loans,
interest subsidies, and federal insurance, but most of them are struc-
tured as "tax expenditure" programs."
A. The Tax Expenditure Concept
Broadly speaking, the term "tax expenditure" describes any re-
duction in a taxpayer's income tax liabilities that results from a special
13. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(E) (2006). Though discharged indebtedness is specifi-
cally included in the internal revenue code's definition of gross income, 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(12)
(2006), discharge through mortgage restructuring on a qualified mortgage before January 1, 2013
is excluded from a taxpayer's income. The provision at § 108(a)(1)(E) was added by the Mort-
gage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-142 (2007), specifically to provide
relief to families experiencing personal hardship because of the mortgage crisis. 153 CONG. REC.
S15,642-02 (2007) (statement of Sen. Stabenow); see also Green Book, supra note 1, at 1 (ex-
plaining that the reason for the Making Work Pay credit is that it "partially offsets the regressiv-
ity of the Social Security payroll tax.. . . [and] effectively raises the income of workers eligible
for the credit, which encourages individuals to enter the labor force"); id. at 3 (explaining that
the expansion of EITC by extending marriage penalty relief will remove "financial impediments
to marriage for some low-income households"); id. at 6 (proposing to make the Saver's Credit
refundable specifically in order "to more effectively encourage moderate- and lower-income in-
dividuals to save for retirement"); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 8 (2008),
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk08.pdf [hereinafter Blue Book] (proposing
to expand tax-preferred savings vehicles and eliminate restrictions on certain tax-preferred ac-
counts in order to simplify and encourage the savings process); id. at 14-15 (proposing to simplify
non-discrimination tests for ERISA qualified retirement accounts and eliminate the test where
non-highly compensated employees contributed at 6% in order to "reduc[e] unnecessary com-
plexity [in order to] save significant compliance costs and ... encourage additional coverage and
retirement saving.").
14. Woo & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 7, at 2; JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-37-09, A
RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 9-10 (May 12, 2008), available at http://
www.jct.gov/x-37-08.pdf. The Joint Committee recently explained a new approach to tax expen-
diture analysis, which provides a "revised classification of tax expenditures ... into two main
categories: . . . 'Tax Subsidies,' and . . . 'Tax-Induced Structural Distortions."' Id. at 9. The new
approach seeks to remove the old, hypothetical "normal" tax from the identification of a tax
expenditure. Id. Instead, "a specific tax provision that is deliberately inconsistent with an iden-
tifiable general rule of the present tax law," a traditionally narrow view of tax expenditures, is
deemed to be a tax subsidy. Id. at 10. Alternately, "structural elements of the Internal Revenue
Code," like the deferral of foreign earnings, are Tax-Induced Structural Distortions, "because
there is no clear consensus as to what general rule of tax law, if any, [such provisions] might
violate." Id.
15. The tax expenditure is a concept developed by the late Professor Stanley S. Surrey, who
served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson admin-
istrations. For an in-depth discussion, see STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
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tax provision for a designated activity.16 The term "tax expenditure"
is explicitly defined in the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 ("Budget Act") as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of
the federal tax law" that allow preferential tax treatment. 7 Thus, the
determination of whether a provision is considered a tax expenditure
depends on whether it is viewed as being consistent or inconsistent
with generally accepted measurements of net income."
Tax expenditures exist in a variety of forms. There are, for exam-
ple, exclusions and deductions from income, credits against a tax-
payer's tax liability, favorable tax rates on income, and deferral of the
payment of certain tax liabilities." The number of provisions classi-
fied as tax expenditures has climbed steadily in recent years. Legisla-
tion enacted in 2005 alone created seventy new tax expenditure
programs for fiscal years 2006-2010.20 The report for fiscal years 2008-
2012 classified more than 170 existing programs as tax expenditures.2 1
Tax expenditure programs are very expensive. Estimates of the
cost of tax expenditures are prepared annually for use in the budget-
ary process, with each tax expenditure being estimated separately.
The cost of a given tax expenditure is calculated by measuring the
difference between what the tax liability is under current law and what
it would have been in the absence of a particular tax expenditure pro-
vision, assuming that all other tax expenditures remain in the tax
code.22 According to a recent Joint Committee estimate, the federal
16. Id. at 30-31 (explaining that there are two types of provisions in the tax law, those that
comprise the "structural provisions that are necessary to implement the income tax" in contrast
to tax expenditure provisions that advance "governmental assistance programs [are] carried out
through special tax provisions.").
17. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344
§ 3(a)(3) (1974).
18. See PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAx POLICY 682 (2d ed. 2004) (providing that the Haig-Simons
income tax baseline method is an accepted method for computing annual tax expenditures).
19. See supra notes 15, 17.
20. This number includes programs that were extended. JoINu COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-
2-06, ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 30-42 (2006) [herein-
after JCT Estimates 2006-2010], available at http://www.jct.gov/s-2-06.pdf. This number excludes
the programs that were extended. Id. at 43; see PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 361 (6th ed. 2008).
21. See JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-2-08, ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FIS-
CAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 43 (2008) [hereinafter ICT Estimates 2008-2012], available at http://
www.jct.gov/s-2-08.pdf. The Joint Committee Staff report for fiscal years 2008-2012 lists in ex-
cess of 170 different tax expenditure programs. Id. This number excludes programs that total
less than $50 million over the five-year reporting period. Id.; see McDANIEL ET AL., supra note
20, at 360.
22. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-3-07, ESTIMATES OF TAX EXPENDITURES FOR Fis-
CAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 20 (2007) [hereinafter JCT Estimates 2007-2011], available at http://
www.jct.gov/s-3-07.pdf; see McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 20, at 360.
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government will forgo over $739.6 billion in revenues in 2009 because
of tax expenditures.23
The 1974 Budget Act requires that budgets submitted to Con-
gress contain a special analysis and detailed tabulation of all income
tax expenditures.2 4 Additionally, the staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation publishes annual reports on tax expenditures. 2 5 These re-
ports measure forgone revenue in connection with a specific initiative
and determine which taxpayers and sectors of the economy benefit
most from each program.26  The Joint Committee report, however,
does not make a judgment as a matter of public policy regarding the
desirability or effectiveness of a particular tax expenditure.2 7
Tax expenditures are functionally equivalent to direct expendi-
tures, and can be used effectively to encourage certain behavior and
to accomplish important social objectives. 28 However, because these
initiatives are accomplished through tax preferences in the tax system
rather than direct outlays, their design and application present unique
challenges and additional costs. 29 First, tax expenditures add adminis-
23. See JCT Estimates 2008-2012, supra note 21, at 51; see also LEONARD BERMAN, ERIC
TODER, & CHRISTOPHER GEISSLER, How BIG ARE TOTAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES, AND
WHO BENEFITS FROM THEM? (Urban Inst. 2008), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
UploadedPDF/1001234_taxexpenditurespdf.
24. See OLIVER, supra note 18, at 682 (noting Congress' requirement that tax expenditures
be compiled and quantified on an annual basis).
25. See, e.g., JCT Estimates 2008-2012, supra note 21, at 43 (excluding all tax expenditure
programs with total costs less than $50 million over the five-year period).
26. Id. at 71-73.
27. The Joint Committee writes:
Tax expenditure analysis can help both policymakers and the public to understand the
actual size of government, the uses to which government resources are put, and the tax
and economic policy consequences that follow from the implicit or explicit choices
made in fashioning legislation.... Tax expenditure analysis is (or should be) simply an
analytical tool, not a criticism of current law or an expression of a normatively superior
alternative tax system.... [B]y quantifying . . . the forgone revenues association with
[a] tax expenditure, this pamphlet provides policymakers with an analytical framework
and with quantitative data that they can employ in judging the merits of each such
item... . The inclusion in this pamphlet of an item as a tax expenditure ... is not meant
to convey that the provision in any fashion is necessarily problematic in the context of
the larger policy issues that Congress considers in fashioning every piece of legislation.
Id. at 1-2.
28. C. Eugene Steuerle & Gilliam Reynolds, Tax Expenditures: What Is the Tax Expenditure
Budget?, Tax Policy Center Urban Institute & Brookings Institute (July 17, 2009), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/expenditures/budget.cfm ("Tax ex-
penditures operate essentially like direct expenditures, even though they appear as tax breaks.");
see also Green Book, supra note 1; Blue Book, supra note 13.
29. JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE
ANALYSIS 57 (2008), available at http://www.jct.gov/x-37-08.pdf.
Tax expenditures generally contribute to the compliance burden of the income tax.
Some have suggested that not only do they make the tax system more complex because
they require distinctions between subsidized and unsubsidized activities, but also they
raise compliance costs, IRS costs of administration, and rates of noncompliance. To the
[VOL. 53:283290
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trative burdens to the Internal Revenue Service. These programs
force the Internal Revenue Service to be involved in matters of social
policy that are totally unrelated to the agency's primary function of
raising revenue.3 0 Therefore, using the tax system for such purposes
requires the Internal Revenue Service to be responsible for the ad-
ministration of numerous programs that ordinarily would be within
the purview of other departments or agencies.3 1 The administration
of special initiatives is labor intensive and makes it necessary for the
Internal Revenue Service to devote significant resources to compli-
ance and enforcement efforts associated with each program. For ex-
ample, the Internal Revenue Service must draft regulations to clarify
and explain the relevant laws. It also is required to issue rulings, con-
duct audits, and pursue litigation related to the special programs.3 2
Tax expenditures also add tremendous complexity to the tax law.
The rules and regulations relating to these programs do not exist in
isolation; they must operate and interface with all of the other provi-
sions of the applicable law. By way of illustration, the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act is administered by both the Department
of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service, leading to multiple layers
of reporting and administrative compliance involving two or three en-
tities (EBSA, IRS, PBGC) and their respective regulations.3 3 The in-
terrelationship of these provisions makes it difficult to determine the
extent that individuals and businesses must devote resources to tracking tax-preferred
activities due to tax expenditures, this raises compliance costs. Refining tax expendi-
tures by better targeting them to their intended beneficiaries may have the unintended
consequence of also increasing complexity. Tax expenditures also increase the length
of instructions and the time required to complete tax returns.
Id.
30. Internal Revenue Service, The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, http://www.
irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98141,00.html.
31. For example, programs encouraging home ownership might be better administered by
the Federal Housing Administration.
32. McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 20, at 362; see CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN
WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1997)
("Agencies thought to be irrelevant to [tax expenditure administration], notably the Treasury
Department and its Internal Revenue Service (IRS), emerge and take center stage."); see also
Eric T. Laity, The Corporation as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional De-
sign, 28 VA. TAX REV. 411, 442 (2008) (discussing Congress' delegation of the administration of
tax expenditures to the Internal Revenue Service).
33. See Employee Benefits Security Administration, History of EBSA and ERISA, http://
www.dol.gov/ebsalaboutebsa/history.html ("The Employee Benefits Security Administration is
responsible for administering and enforcing the fiduciary, reporting and disclosure provisions of
Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)."); Internal Revenue
Service, Tax Information for Retirement Plans Community, http://www.irs.gov/retirement/index.
html (providing links to published guidance, forms, and examination/enforcement information
relevant to IRS regulation of retirement plans); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Wel-
come to PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov ("PBGC is a federal corporation created by [ERISA that]
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extent to which the complexity of the existing tax system is attributa-
ble to the income tax itself, or to the administration of various tax
expenditure programs. 3 4 As a consequence, the use of tax expendi-
tures significantly impacts the function of the overall tax system. An-
other issue raised by the use of the tax system to advance public policy
initiatives is whether there is sufficient scrutiny and oversight of these
programs as compared to other social programs administered by agen-
cies or departments whose responsibilities are devoted to a specific
purpose.35 Notwithstanding the magnitude of the costs reflected in
the tax expenditure budget for tax expenditures, the real costs are sig-
nificantly understated. They do not account for externalities, such as
the complexity they add, and the administrative burdens they impose
on the Internal Revenue Service. 6
Of equal or greater importance, however, is that tax expenditures
raise additional concerns regarding the equity and effectiveness of the
underlying programs because the structure and utilization of many tax
expenditures disproportionately benefit high-income taxpayers. In
particular, these initiatives raise the questions of: (1) whether the cost
of certain tax expenditures can be justified in view of who benefits
most from them; (2) whether, as currently designed, certain tax expen-
diture programs inappropriately contribute to the increasing economic
disparity of individuals in this country; and (3) whether the existing
structure of certain tax expenditure programs is appropriate to deliver
benefits to low and moderate-income taxpayers? These questions are
especially pertinent to the asset-building initiatives administered
through the tax law.
B. Asset Building Policies
Because of the importance of saving and the challenges that
many individuals face in saving on their own, there are numerous tax
expenditures specifically designed to provide incentives for different
forms of individual asset building behavior. The impact of each of
protects the pensions of more than 44 million American workers and retirees in more than
29,000 private single-employer and multi-employer defined benefit pension plans.").
34. McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 20, at 362; HOWARD, supra note 32, at 17 (positing the
controversy surrounding classifications of tax provisions as expenditures).
35. Woo & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 7, at 2.
36. See supra notes 23 & 29.
37. See generally Woo & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 7 (analyzing the impact and gravity of tax
expenditures designed to incentive homeownership, retirement savings, general saving and in-
vestment, and small business development).
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these asset building programs has been extensive, and continues to
have a profound effect on the financial stability of American taxpay-
ers. Therefore, as we consider the re-distributional effect of recent tax
proposals, it is both useful and necessary to consider the distributional
aspects of these programs. It is particularly important to determine
not only the cost of the programs, but also who benefits from them,
and how well the programs accomplish their intended objectives.
Asset building programs can be divided into four main categories:
(1) retirement savings, (2) home-ownership, (3) savings and invest-
ments, and (4) small business development. By far, the largest and
most costly of these programs is the tax expenditures for the favorable
tax treatment of employer sponsored retirement plans." In 2009
alone, the tax expenditure for this program was $128.2 billion. 4 0 The
employee-benefit related tax expenditure as a whole, including both
retirement and welfare benefits, reached $348 billion for fiscal year
2009.41
38. LILLIAN Woo & DAVID BUCHHOLZ, RETURN ON INVESTMENT? GETTING MORE FROM
FEDERAL ASSET-BUILDING POLICIES 2 (Corp. for Enter. Dev., D.C. 2006), available at http://
www.assetpolicy.org/files/File/return oninvestment.pdf [hereinafter Woo & Buchholz II]. For a
discussion of these asset-building policies in the broader context of economic mobility see ADAM
CARASso, GILLIAN REYNOLDS, & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, How MUCH DOES THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SPEND TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND FOR WHOM? 2 (2008) (Pew
Charicable Trusts/Econ. Mobility Project), available at http://www.economicmobility.org/assets/
pdfs/PEW EMPFEDERAL.SPENDING.pdf (discussing the impact of certain categories of di-
rect spending and tax expenditures, including "1. Employer-related work subsidies (e.g., 401(k)
plans and exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance premiums and medical
care); 2. Homeownership . . . 3. Savings and investment incentives ... [and] 8. Business incen-
tives and development").
39. Historically, the retirement program is the biggest category of asset building tax ex-
penditures, as well as of all tax expenditures. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of
Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 874 (1987). This holds true today.
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation's most recent estimates, total retirement expendi-
tures (those for ESOP, Keogh, Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and IRAs) will continue
to "out-cost" the next largest category of asset building expenditure: traditional housing expend-
itures (deductions for mortgage interest, property taxes, mortgage insurance premiums, and the
exclusion of capital gains on home sales). See JCT Estimates 2008-2012, supra note 21, 50 tbl.2
(showing 2008 estimates of $121.3 billion for retirement and $109.3 billion for housing; 2009
estimates of $128.2 billion for retirement and $114.4 billion for housing; 2010 estimates of $147.2
billion for retirement and $120.3 billion for housing; and 2011 estimates of $160.6 billion for
retirement and $145.8 billion for housing).
40. See JCT Estimates 2006-2010, supra note 20, at 51-59 tbl.2 (showing tax expenditure
estimates in billions allocated to the following programs: Special tax provisions for employee
stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 0.5; Deferral of taxation on spread on acquisition of stock under
incentive stock option plans and employee stock purchase plans [0.4]; Exclusion of pension con-
tributions and earnings for Keogh plans 9.8; Defined benefit plans 42.8; Defined contribution
plans 55.2; Traditional IRAs 15.6; Roth IRAs 3.1; and other IRA deferrals 0.8).
41. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TAX EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYEE BEN-
EFrrs: ESTIMATES FROM THE FY 2009 BUDGET, FACTS FROM EBRI (Emp. Benefit Res. Inst.,
D.C.) (Feb. 2008), at 1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdflpubications/facts/0208fact.pdf. The
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Given the cost, size, and importance of individual asset building
policies, one might believe that such programs would benefit a cross-
section of the population, but this is not the case. In 2004, the Corpo-
ration for Enterprise Development (CFED) conducted a comprehen-
sive study to review the nation's spending and tax policy regarding its
asset building programs.4 2 The study concluded that benefits from the
programs overwhelmingly accrue to very high-income households. 43
In theory, most tax expenditures are universal in their application
and are not limited to a specific sector of the population with respect
to income, wealth, or other qualifiers.4 4 However, the structure of
most special programs, including the asset-building category, dispro-
portionately benefits high-income taxpayers. Over 33.3% of the bene-
fits of tax expenditure programs in 2005 went to 1% of the wealthiest
taxpayers, as compared to less than 5% that went to taxpayers with
the lowest 60% of income.4 5 This result occurs in part because of the
progressive tax rate structure of the federal income tax system that
makes exclusions, deductions, and tax deferral more valuable to tax-
payers with higher marginal tax rates.46 Also, the types of activities
that are encouraged, and the extent to which the preferential tax
treatment is available, often favor high-income taxpayers with more
disposable income. 47 When tax subsidies are skewed in favor of high-
income taxpayers and provide relatively little assistance to low-in-
come taxpayers, they are referred to as upside-down-subsidies be-
cause of their perverse effect. 48
tax expenditure estimate for employer-based retirement plans for fiscal years 2009-2013 totals
$541.3 billion. Id.
42. CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., supra note 6, at 1.
43. Id. at 2-3.
44. There are programs that utilize income phase-outs to target specific groups, such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"). See 26 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2006).
45. Woo & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 7, at 1.
46. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANAL-
vsis, JCX-37-08, 52 (2008) ("Tax expenditure design . . . can have a significant effect on vertical
equity [among taxpayers]. For example, tax expenditures formulated as deductions will gener-
ally reduce the progressivity of the tax system, by reducing average tax rates more for higher
marginal rate taxpayers than for lower marginal rate taxpayers. In contrast, tax expenditures
structured as credits would generally increase the progressivity of the tax system. A credit will
create uniform incentives and provide uniform benefits to all individuals if it is structured as a
refundable credit.").
47. For example, § 121 of the I.R.C. allows taxpayers to exclude as much as $500,000 (joint
return) of capital gains on the sale of a principal residence. See 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2006).
48. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPEN-
DITURE ANALYSIS, supra note 46, at 49 (explaining that the progressivity-reducing impact of
such expenditures are "what Stanley Surrey termed the "upside down" subsidy effect of tax
expenditures structured as deductions").
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Some may argue that the U.S. tax system uses a progressive tax
rate structure; therefore, it is both appropriate and desirable for high-
income taxpayers to receive greater benefits because they pay more in
taxes.4 9 However, the CFED study shows that, although the top 1%
of earners paid an average tax rate of 22.6%, they received as much as
45.3% of the benefit from certain asset building programs.50 Thus,
high-income households received benefits from such programs at a
rate that more than doubled what they paid in income taxes. In con-
trast, low-income households that presumably need the benefits more,
received very low levels of benefits, and rates of return from the same
programs.
C. The Ability-to-Pay Concept
One of the fundamental tenants of a just tax is that a taxpayer's
tax liability should be correlated in some manner with the taxpayer's
ability to pay.5 2 The origin of this principle in the United States tax
system dates back as far as the Income Tax Act of 1913, where the
legislative history explains that the income tax is "levied according to
ability-to-pay." The ability-to-pay principle is widely accepted as the
most viable and equitable method by which to allocate tax burdens,
although reasonable minds differ as to what constitutes appropriate
49. See, e.g., Curtis S. Dubay, The Rich Pay More Taxes: Top 20 Percent Pay Record Share of
Income Taxes 1, 2420 WEBMEMO (Heritage Foundation May 4, 2009, available at http://www.
heritage.org/research/taxes/upload/wm_2420.pdf.
50. Woo & BUCHHOLZ II, supra note 38, at 7 ("Of the three largest [individual] asset-
building policies-the mortgage interest deduction, the property tax deduction, and preferential
rates on capital gains and dividends-over 45% of the subsidies go to the top 1% households,
whose average income exceed $1.25 million."). Specifically, with regard to tax benefits for de-
fined contribution plans, the top 10% of earners reap 50% of the benefit. Leonard E. Burman,
William G. Gale, Matthew Hall & Peter R. Orzag, Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution
Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts, 16 THE URBAN INST. 26 (2004), available at http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311029_.TPCDP16.pdf. Taxpayers with incomes over
$1 million receive an average tax benefit of $4,365, while taxpayers making between $10,000 and
$20,000 receive and average of $41. Id. at 40.
51. Burman, et al., supra note 50, at 9 ("The bottom quintile gets almost no benefit from the
income tax exclusion because few people in this category contribute to pensions or IRAs, those
who do tend to contribute smaller shares of their income than do higher-income contributors,
and the tax benefit person dollar of contribution is smaller, and in some cases worthless, because
they face low or zero marginal income tax rates."); see also Woo & BUCHHOLZ, supra note 7, at
2; Woo & BUCHHOLZ II, supra note 38, at 7.
52. See infra note 54.
53. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need
for Renewed Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 7 (2001); ROBERT M. WILLAN, INCOME TAXES:
CONCISE HISTORY & PRIMER 139 (1994).
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distinctions among taxpayers with differing levels of income. 5 4 For ex-
ample, some believe that the ability-to-pay should be based on a pro-
portional or flat tax rate structure, while others believe that it should
be based on a progressive tax rate. No one, however, argues for a
regressive tax rate schedule." Thus, by the prevailing definitions of
fairness, tax policy should make appropriate distinctions among tax-
payers having different levels of income, and it should not impose
higher tax burdens on those who have less.
The current benefit distribution of the asset building programs is
in direct conflict with this well-established principle. The preferential
tax treatment of these programs substantially lowers the effective tax
rates on the savings and asset accumulation of taxpayers at the highest
income levels without comparable reductions for those at the lower
levels.56 Considering the purpose of the asset building programs, this
result would appear not only to violate basic concepts of fairness, but
also those of simple logic. Taxpayers who have more resources pre-
sumably would be able to save in the absence of special initiatives;
thus, the tax expenditure is unnecessary for these individuals. Fur-
thermore, because individual asset accumulation is essential for the
economic stability of society, all-not just some-taxpayers should be
encouraged to save. Consequently, in order to justify the cost of the
asset-building programs as well as to accomplish their intended pur-
poses, it is necessary to also make savings assistance available to those
who have fewer resources and are unable to save on their own. This is
particularly true of the private retirement system, in which contribu-
tions of employees and employers alike are encouraged to help ensure
the retirement security of today's workers. An examination of who
benefits most from this program and how its structure favors certain
groups will hopefully encourage policymakers to consider re-structur-
ing the system to be more inclusive of low and moderate-income
taxpayers.
54. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOKS IV-V 416 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
1904) ("The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government,
as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities . . . ."); see also Richard A. Mus-
grove, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in THE ONGOINo DEBATE: TAx JUSTICE 9,
13-15 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
55. See Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, "Globaliza-
tion, " and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 731, 733-37 (2000).
56. This results in a flatter, less progressive tax structure.
57. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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II. FEDERAL INCOME TAX POLICY AND PRIVATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Retirement plans that operationally meet the requirements of In-
ternal Revenue Code section 401(a) are said to be qualified plans.
The qualified status of a plan entitles employers, as well as plan par-
ticipants, to substantial tax benefits. The first tax advantage is that the
employer receives a current deduction when the contributions are
made to the plan, but the employee is not taxed until the contributions
are distributed." This treatment is an exception to the general rule
that an employer is not permitted to take a tax deduction for salary-
related expenditures as an ordinary and necessary business expense
before the employee includes the payments in income. 9 The second
tax advantage is that income earned on the accumulated contributions
is not taxed until distribution."o This treatment allows a tax-free
build-up of the investment earnings, and is the essence of the
favorable tax treatment of qualified retirement plans."
The tax subsidy for retirement savings was introduced in the
1920s.6 2 Since that time, retirement assets have grown steadily rela-
tive to the economy as a whole. Retirement plans held only 3% of all
financial assets in 1950; whereas, in 1984 they held almost 17%.6 In-
stitutional investors, of which pension funds are the largest category,
58. See 26 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2006).
59. Id.
The significance of section 404's matching principle becomes evident when one
compares the treatment of qualified and nonqualitied plans to be "matched," an em-
ployer cannot take tax deductions for payments to its employees until the participants
include those payments in their taxable income-that is, until the employees actually
receive the compensation promised to them.
Qualified plans, in contrast, are not governed by the matching principle and conse-
quently generate concurrent tax benefits to employers. Although employees are not
taxed upon the benefits they receive from the plan until they actually receive them, an
employer's contributions to a qualified plan are deductible when paid to the trust.
I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(1) & 404(a). Thus, the employer may take an immediate, unmatched
deduction for any contribution it makes to a qualified plan.
Albertson's, Inc. v. C.I.R., 42 F.3d 537, 543 (9th Cir. 1994).
60. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 408(e) (2006).
61. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money", 95 YALE
L.J. 506, 519-22 (1986). Although traditional Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs) fall
outside the qualified plan regime, they receive similar preferential tax treatment, and for some
purposes are considered as being an integral part of the private retirement system. See Karen C.
Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings Accounts, 25
VA. TAX REV. 1101, 1107-08 (2006).
62. Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, § 234 (a)(1) (1921) (providing a deduction for busi-
ness expenses such as "salaries or other [including deferred] compensation").
63. RICHARD A. IPPOLrro, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-24 (1986).
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are the largest holders of American financial assets.64 Pension fund
assets currently total more than $5 trillion and account for almost 50%
of all available investment assets in this country.65
The preferential tax treatment of qualified plans has been justi-
fied as a method of encouraging employers to establish and maintain
plans that provide retirement benefits to low-wage employees who
may undervalue retirement savings, or find it difficult to save on their
own.66 Notwithstanding the fact that the tax subsidy for qualified re-
tirement plans has been very valuable to high-income individuals and
has allowed them to accumulate significant amounts of retirement sav-
ings, these plans have been ineffective in either encouraging or in-
creasing the retirement savings among low and moderate-income
individuals.
Participation rates among low-income workers in the private re-
tirement system is relatively low, and continues to decline.6 7 As of
2008, the overall percentage of workers who participated in employer-
sponsored retirement plans was approximately 51%, of which the
64. Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Control of U.S.
Equity Market Assets (Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.conference-
board.org/UTILITIES/pressDetail.cfm?pressID=2726. In 2003, institutional investors "con-
trolled $7.974 trillion in equities or 59.2% of outstanding equities in the U.S." Id.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN
BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES, 10 tbl.E-11 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/pri-
vatepensionplanbulletinhistoricaltables.pdf (reporting total pension plan assets of over $5 trillion
in 2005, with $2.25 trillion in defined benefit plans and $2.8 trillion in defined contribution
plans); Press Release, The Conference Bd., U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Control of U.S.
Equity Market Assets, supra note 64. Pension funds owned 40.7% of total U.S. equity assets in
2003, almost double the holdings of either investment companies or insurance companies, and
nearly four times bank and trust equity holdings. Id.
66. Pension Parity: Addressing the Inequities Between Retirement Plan Options for Small
and Large Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Small Business Subcomm. for Finance and Tax,
109th Cong. (2007) (statement of Jim McCarthy, Managing Director, Retirement Plan Services
Morgan Stanley, on behalf of the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association), available
at www.simfa.org/legslative/testimony/pdflMcCarthylO-23-07.pdf; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: GOVERNMENT ACrIONs COULD ENCOURAGE
MORE EMPLOYERS TO OFFER IRAs To EMPLOYEES, GAO-08-890T (2008), available at www.
gao.gov/new.items/d08890t.pdf; see Burke & McCouch, supra note 61, at 1105-07; Letter from
James A. Klein, American Benefits Council President, to The President's Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform (Apr. 25, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.american
benefitscouncil.org/documents/taxreformletter042905.pdf.
67. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS:
TRENDS FROM 1998 To 2006, at 7 (2009) [hereinafter RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION]. From
2003 to 2006, participation rates in defined contribution plans-the most popular type of private
retirement plan-dropped from 18.7% to 16.1% among workers with monthly incomes in the
third quartile. Workers with monthly incomes in the top quartile consistently report participa-
tion rates near or above 60%. Id.
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largest portion came from the population with the highest income.68
Almost 70% of workers in the highest quartile, those with income in
excess of $65,000, currently participate in employer-sponsored retire-
ment plans; whereas, only 30% of workers in the lowest quartile,
those with income under $28,000, participate in these plans.69 For this
reason, some have argued that to the extent that the private retire-
ment system is intended to benefit low and moderate-income employ-
ees, the system has failed.o
A major reason that the private retirement system is increasingly
ineffective in encouraging savings among low and moderate income-
workers can be explained by the recent shift from the use of tradi-
tional defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans as primary
retirement savings vehicles. These popular savings arrangements
often require elective contributions by plan participants, making it less
likely that low and moderate-income taxpayers will either participate
or contribute amounts sufficient for their retirement security. Fur-
thermore, even when such workers do set aside funds for retirement,
these savings vehicles fail to provide adequate protection against the
inherent investment risks associated with such plans.7 2 The lack of
protection against plan losses is problematic for all participants, but
has a disparate impact on low and moderate-income taxpayers be-
cause they have fewer resources from which to draw to make-up the
difference.
A. Participation in Section 401(k) Plans Among Low and
Moderate-Income Workers
The composition of the private retirement system has changed
significantly since the passage of the Employee Retirement Security
68. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PENSION SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION: SUMMARY OF
RECENT TRENDS, CRS-RL30122, at 4 (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL301
22 20090911.pdf [hereinafter PENSION SPONSORSHIP]; LANGBEIN, STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 26 (4th ed. 2007); THE RETIREMENT SECURITY PROJECT,
PROTECTING Low-INCOME FAMILIES' SAVINGS: How RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS ARE TREATED IN
MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS AND STEPS To REMOVE BARRIERS To RETIREMENT SAVING, RSP
POLICY BRIEF 7 (2005), available at http://www.retirementsecurityproject.org/pubs/File/Asset-
TestReport.final.pdf.
69. PENSION SPONSORSHIP, supra note 68, at 11-13.
70. See, e.g., Ross Eisenbrey, Vice President Economic Policy Institute, Why We Need Re-
tirement USA, Address to the National Press Club (Mar. 10, 2009), available at www.epi.org/
publications/entry/why-we-needretirementusal.
71. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Part II.B.
2010]1 299
Howard Law Journal
Act (ERISA) of 1974." When ERISA was enacted, traditional de-
fined benefit plans were the most common type of retirement plan,
and defined contribution plans were used primarily as supplemental
savings arrangements. 4 In a traditional defined benefit plan, the plan
assets are pooled into an aggregate trust and the participant is guaran-
teed a retirement benefit of a fixed amount.7 1 In such plans, the em-
ployer is required to fund the plan sufficiently to pay for the promised
benefit and is liable for the payment of the benefit, despite the invest-
ment performance of the plan assets. Thus, the employer, rather than
the participant, bears the risk of investment losses. 7 6 To protect de-
fined benefit plans participants in the event that the employer be-
comes insolvent, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
insures a limited accrued benefit. The maximum insurable benefit is
phased in over a five-year period and, for plans terminating in 2010,
the benefit equals approximately $54,000 per year for an individual
who retires at age 65.7
Over the last two decades, there has been a discernable shift from
using traditional defined benefit plans as primary retirement savings
73. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974). ERISA completely revised the legal framework
of the qualified pension plan as it had previously existed. Id.; see also Enron and Beyond En-
hancing Works Retirement Security: Hearing Before the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce,
107th Cong. 9-11 (2002) [hereinafter Enron Hearing] (statement of Dr. Jack L. VanDerhei,
Ph.D, Healthcare Management, Temple University and EBRI Fellow); see RICHARD IPPOLrrO,
PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE, ANALYSIS, AND POLIcY 4-5 (1997)
(noting that the share of workers covered by defined benefit plans dropped from 83% to 50%
from 1979 to 1996). The most significant innovations of ERISA concerned participation, vesting,
and funding standards. Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49
BuFF. L. REV. 513, 514 n.1 (2001) [hereinafter Jefferson, Striking a Balance].
74. John W. Thompson, Defined Benefit Plans at the Dawn of ERISA, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20050325ar01pl.htm ([In] "1974,
nearly 31 million workers were covered by private pensions, with 27 million [87% of those cov-
ered] enrolled in defined benefit plans").
75. The Department of Labor explains:
A defined benefit plan promises you a specified monthly benefit at retirement.
The plan may state this promised benefit as an exact dollar amount, such as $100 per
month at retirement. Or, more commonly, it may calculate a benefit through a plan
formula that considers such factors as salary and service-for example, 1 percent of
your average salary for the last 5 years of employment for every year of service with
your employer.
Employee Benefits Security Administration, FAQs About Pension Plans and ERISA, http://
www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-consumer-pension.html.
76. See I.R.C. § 412 (2006); Regina T. Jefferson, Post-Enron Pension Reform: Where Do We
Go from Here?, in N.Y.U. REV. EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION § 10.02[2], at 10-
6 (Alvin D. Lurie ed., 2003) [hereinafter Jefferson, Post-Enron Pension Reform].
77. Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, Mission Statement, http://www.pbgc.gov (click
on the link "Who We Are") (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
78. Press Release, Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, PBGC Announces Maximum
Insurance Benefit for 2010 (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.pbgc.gov/medialnews-archivelnews-
releases/2009/prlO-02.html.
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vehicles to using defined contribution plans.79 In a defined contribu-
tion plan, there is no single trust; instead, participants are assigned
individual accounts to which the employer makes annual contribu-
tions.so At retirement, participants receive the balances in their ac-
counts.81 Thus, the success or failure of these savings programs
depends on how much has been contributed, and how well the assets
have been invested.82 Because there is neither a guarantee of a spe-
cific amount at retirement nor PBGC insurance, the participant alone
bears the risk of investment losses.
The numerous types of plans and features available within de-
fined contribution plans accommodate the preferences and risk toler-
ances of different employers and employees.' The cash or deferred
arrangement, better known as the section 401(k) plan, represents the
79. The Effects of Recent Turmoil in Financial Markets on Retirement Security, Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 110th Cong 2 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office) available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/98xx/doc9864/10-07-RetirementSecurityTestimony.pdf ("Over the past several decades,
the private-sector pension system has shifted dramatically toward defined-contribution plans,
such as 401(k) plans."). Specifically, in the twenty years from 1985 to 2006, defined benefit plans
fell by 74% and "the number of workers participating in defined benefit plans fell from 27 mil-
lion in 1985 to 19.5 million in 2008." PENSION SPONSORSHIP, supra note 68, at 4.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2006) (The ERISA definition section, providing that an "'in-
dividual account plan' or 'defined contribution plan' [as] a pension plan which provides for an
individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contrib-
uted to the participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses" of that partici-
pant's account); Edward A. Zelinksy, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451,
455-58 (2004). Zelinksy explains:
The distinction between defined benefit and defined contribution plans is surprisingly
clear. A defined benefit plan, as its name implies, specifies an output for the partici-
pant. . . . In contrast, a defined contribution arrangement, as its equally apt moniker
indicates, specifies an input for the participant. Commonly, the plan defines the em-
ployer's contribution for each participant as a percentage of the participant's salary for
that year. Having made that contribution, the employer's obligation to fund is over
because the employee is not guaranteed a particular benefit, just a specified input. In a
defined contribution context, the participant's ultimate economic entitlement is the
amount to which the defined contributions for her, plus earnings, grow or shrink.
Id. at 455-58.
81. Zelinsky, supra note 80, at 455-58.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002; Zelinksy, supra note 80; see also Hearings, supra note 79, at 3.
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); Jefferson, Post-Enron Pension Reform, supra note 76, at 10-17.
From the employer's perspective, the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution
plans can be explained by the fact that defined contribution plans are less expensive and less
administratively burdensome to maintain than defined benefit plans. From the employee's per-
spective, the popularity of defined contribution plans can be explained by the fact that they
provide simpler benefits, and provide greater portability, which allows workers to change em-
ployment without experiencing significant reductions in their retirement benefits. For a more
extensive discussion of different plan types, see Enron Hearing, supra note 73, at 3. See also
LANGBEIN, STABILE & WOLK, supra note 68, at 43-55.
84. LANGBEIN, STABILE & WOLK, supra note 68, at 45-52 (providing a survey of various




fastest growing type of defined contribution plan, and it dominates
new plan offerings in the private sector." As of 2005, contributions to
section 401(k) plans alone exceeded the combined contributions made
to traditional defined benefit plans and those made to all other de-
fined contribution plans." Section 401(k) plans currently account for
as much as 64.2% of all qualified retirement plans and cover 46% of
all participating employees." Under these plans, employees elect to
have portions of their compensation contributed to qualified retire-
ment plans, rather than receive them as compensation in the year in
which they are earned." Although employers are permitted to make
non-elective contributions to plan participants, most 401(k) plan con-
tributions are made on behalf of only those employees who elect to
participate.8 9
Notwithstanding the preferential tax treatment of contributions
to qualified plans, low and moderate-income employees covered by
such plans often do not elect to make contributions because they need
their disposable income to satisfy current and more pressing ex-
penses.90 Thus, to encourage greater participation among this group,
employers offering 401(k) plans will often provide additional incen-
85. These plans are referred to as section 401(k) plans because this is the section of the
I.R.C. that governs such plans. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2006). 401(k) plans have grown from 17,303
plans in 1985 to 436,207 plans in 2005, with a more than twenty-six fold increase in total assets.
U.S. DEFT. OF LABOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULL. His-
TORICAL TABLES 19 tbl.E20 (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/privatepensionplan
bulletinhistoricaltables.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE PENSION PLAN].
86. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN, supra note 85, at 13 tbl.E14, 19 tbl.E20 (showing contributions
in millions of $223,533 to 401(k) plans, $92,662 to defined benefit plans, and $25,255 to all other
defined contribution plans). 401(k) plans have received the largest share of contributions for
over ten years. John B. Shoven & David A. Wise, Extending the Consumption Tax Treatment of
Personal Retirement Savings, 88 AM. EcoN. REV. 197, 197 (1998). In 1998, approximately $100
billion was contributed annually to section 401(k) plans, which represented a 100% increase
from 1990. Id.
87. Section 401(k) plans account for 426,207 of the 679,095 total qualified plans in 2005 and
54,623,000 of the total 117,406,000 employees who participated in any kind of qualified retire-
ment plan. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN, supra note 85, at 1 tbl.E1, 5 tbl.E6, 20 tbl.E21.
88. 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2)(A) (2006).
89. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: Low DEFINED CONTRI-
BUTION PLAN SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES TO RETIREMENT SECURITY, ESPECIALLY FOR
MANY Low-INCOME WORKERS, GAO-08-8, at 8 n.12 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d088.pdf [hereinafter PRIVATE PENSIONS: Low DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN].
90. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: MANY TAKE ADVAN-
TAGE OF OPPORTUNITY To ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INCOME, GAO-/HEHS-96-176, at
4-6 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96176.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT
1996] (finding that 60% of employees with income less than $25,000 per year have no pension
coverage, and subsequently must rely on social security as their only retirement security); see
Regina T. Jefferson, Comment to Pensions and Savings-In What Form?, in FRAMING THE So-
CIAL SECURITY DEBATE 107 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998); see also Anne Willette, 401(k)
Plans Benefit the Wealthy, USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 1997, at 13A.
[VOL. 53:283302
Redistribution in the Private Retirement System
tives for participation by matching the employees' elected contribu-
tions in some form or fashion. For example, the employer may match
100% of the first 1% of pay contributed by the employee and then
match 50% of contributions in excess of 1%, up to a specified limit.9 1
Even with the prevalence of such incentives, however, less than one
half of all workers who earn under $15,000 per year contribute to their
401(k) plans.9 2 Additionaly, when these workers do contribute, they
tend to contribute smaller percentages of their income than higher-
income workers. In 1992, taxpayers with income below $25,000 made
contributions of only 3.7% of their income, while taxpayers with in-
come over $75,000 made contributions of 7.9% of their income. 9 3
Consequently, low and moderate-income workers with 401(k) plans
are far less likely to accumulate adequate savings for retirement. In
2008, 54.2% of participating employees earning $20,000 to $40,000 an-
nually saved less than $5,000 in their plans.94 Such small amounts are
grossly inadequate in providing retirement security for these workers.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) introduced various
rules designed to enhance retirement savings among low and moder-
ate-income workers in defined contribution plans.95 These rules in-
clude provisions that encourage automatic rollovers, require faster
91. The matching contributions are subject to nondiscrimination rules. See I.R.C.
§ 401(k)(m) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(b)(3) (as amended in 1995); see also JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAw 332-37 (3d ed. 2000).
92. See Employee Benefits Research Institute, EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits
(1995), http://www.ebri.org/publications/books/index.cfm?fa=databook [hereinafter EBRI
Databook].
93. PRIVATE PENSIONS: Low DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN, supra note 89, at 22.
94. How Well Are Employees Saving and Investing in 401(k) Plans, HEWIT[ UNIVERSE
BENCHMARKS 2009, at 17, available at http://www.hewittassociates.com/Intl/nA/enUs/Knowledge
center/ArticlesReports/ArticleDetail.aspx?cid=6863&tid=0 (click on "Access a copy of this re-
port," fill out the form on the next screen, and click "next"). In 2001, the average balance in
employer sponsored defined contribution plans among moderate and low-income taxpayers ap-
proaching retirement was only $10,400. ZOE NEUBERGER, ROBERT GREENSTEIN & EILEEN P.
SWEENEY, THE RETIREMENT SECURITY PROJECT, PROTECTING Low-INCOME FAMILIES' SAV-
INGs: How RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS ARE TREATED IN MEANS-TESTED PROGRAMS AND STEPS
To REMOVE BARRIERS To RETIREMENT SAVING 7 (2005), available at http://www.retirement
madesimpler.org/Library/Protecting%20Low%20Income%20Families'%20Savings%20-%20
Full.pdf.
95. Among its many amendments to ERISA, the PPA updated funding and benefit require-
ments for single and multi-employer benefit plans, made efforts to increase the financial health
of PBGC, and provided for greater disclosure of plan information. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 12 Stat.
780 at §§ 101-07, 201-21, 401-12, 501-09 (2006). Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006), made comprehensive changes to ERISA in response to the changing
pension landscape. DAVID N. LEVINE & AUGUST A. IMHOLTZ 111, INTRODUCTION To ERISA:




vesting, and create safe harbors for automatic enrollment.96 However,
these relatively minor adjustments to the law will not remedy the defi-
ciencies of the existing program, as it relates to the retirement security
of low and moderate-income workers. This is because such changes
neither alter the structure of the private retirement system nor elimi-
nate disparities in the level of tax benefits enjoyed by low and high-
income taxpayers.
The challenge of any retirement savings program is to get money
into the participants' accounts, protect the money in the accounts
against the risk of loss until retirement, and distribute the expected
benefits at retirement. Regarding the first challenge, the existing pri-
vate retirement system, with its increasing reliance on 401(k) plans as
primary retirement savings vehicles, is by many measures ineffective
for low and moderate-income taxpayers. Although current pension
policy provides a significant tax subsidy to high-income taxpayers, it
does not provide a comparable subsidy to low and moderate-income
taxpayers. Furthermore, low participation rates among low to moder-
ate-income taxpayers demonstrate that in reality they receive very lit-
tle benefit from the existing system.
These results suggest that low and moderate-income taxpayers
need a different retirement program with different characteristics. An
example of such a program is a universal retirement system, such as
the one described in Part III of this article. This program requires that
all workers be covered by a private plan, and that there be a subsidy
for low and moderate-income taxpayers structured differently than
that under the present system.
Although a universal retirement system with a subsidy for low
and moderate-income workers responds to the first challenge of a re-
tirement savings program by increasing participation among low and
moderate- income workers, and by correcting the reverse subsidy ef-
96. Section 902 of the PPA, titled Increasing Participation Through Automatic Contribution
Arrangements, amended 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) to provide an automatic enrollment plan, where an
employer makes cash or deferred compensation contributions meeting minimum escalation re-
quirements. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902(a), 12 Stat. 780 (2006). It also amends 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(m) by providing a safe harbor for automatic enrollment plans from the nondiscrimination
test for matching contributions and employee contributions. Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902(b). The
PPA also provides for faster vesting of non-elective contributions to both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans by amending 26 U.S.C. § 411(a). Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 904. As a
result, employer contributions to defined benefit plans must either fully vest within five years, or
vest at a minimum of 20% per year, beginning within three years. Id. Employer contributions to
defined contribution plans must either fully vest within three years, or vest at a minimum of 20%
per year, beginning within two years. Id.
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fect, it does not respond to the latter two challenges that involve risk
of loss and erosion of the expected retirement benefit. At each stage
of the retirement savings process, section 401(k) plans are less effec-
tive, and impose greater risks than traditional defined benefit plans.
This is especially true for low and moderate-income workers who have
fewer resources to protect themselves against plan losses. Thus, the
next portion of this article addresses the second and third challenges
of a retirement program as they relate to the various risks in 401(k)
plans, and the lack of protection against these risks provided under
current law.
B. Risk of Loss in Section 401(k) Plans
1. Participant-Directed Plans
Participant-directed plans are a type of 401(k) plan that present
an even greater risk than regular 401(k) plans that low and moderate-
income workers will not accumulate sufficient amounts for retirement.
In participant-directed 401(k) plans, participants, rather than the em-
ployer, must decide not only whether to participate and the level of
compensation to contribute, but also the manner in which their ac-
counts are to be invested." The law imposes no additional education
or notification requirements on employers who sponsor such plans;
therefore, participants often make crucial investment decisions re-
garding their accounts without the benefit of financial training.9 8
Without the benefit of financial professionals to assist in their in-
vestment choices, inexperienced investors typically will disproportion-
ately select low-risk, low-yield instruments that fail to maximize
97. The Employee Benefit Research Institute explains:
There are three different sections of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that estab-
lish salary-reduction retirement plans, based on the sector of employment [including]
401(k) plans . ... All of these plans are voluntary (meaning the employer can choose
whether or not to offer a plan to its workers) and all are defined contribution plans
(meaning they define how much the worker-and the employer, if it chooses to-will
contribute to a worker's retirement account). Typically n these types of plans, the
worker directs at least a portion of how the contributions will be invested (within the
investment options offered by the employer), and bears all the investment risk. Bene-
fits are usually distributed as a lump sum.
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Fundamentals of Employee Benefit Programs 81 (6th ed.
2009), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdflpublications/books/fundamentals/2009/08_4011-Pls-
RETIRMENTFunds_2009.EBRI.pdf.
98. See generally Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment of Defined Contribution
Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 607, 611-12 (2000) [hereinafter Rethinking the Investment] (describing
the risk of benefit shortfalls inherent to 401(k) plans such as a lack of PBGC protection and
fiduciary liability on the part of the employer).
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investment-returns over the long-run.99 A high concentration of such
funds is unlikely to produce sufficient investment income over an em-
ployee's working life to provide adequate retirement income.oo Inex-
perienced investors are not only less likely to adequately diversify
their accounts, but also are less likely to recognize financial indicators
that investment professionals rely on to determine when to shift funds
from one investment to another.101 Accordingly, some participants
may fail to take appropriate measures when changes are indicated by
market conditions, acting either too slowly or too hastily.102 There-
fore, because low and moderate-income workers are less likely to
have the resources to obtain professional financial assistance or to
have prior investment experience, when they do elect to save for re-
tirement, they are exposed to greater risks of loss in participant-di-
rected plans than their higher-income counterparts.10 3 As a result,
low and moderate-income workers often receive significantly smaller
benefits than those they expect, and upon which they have relied. 10 4
2. Lump Sums Payments Versus Life Annuities
In traditional defined benefit plans, the normal retirement benefit
is expressed as an amount certain, payable at retirement in the form of
a qualified joint and survivor annuity (QJSA). A QJSA is an annuity
payable for the life of the participant, with at least a 50% survivor
99. See Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Suden, 401 (k) Plans Are Still Coming Up Short, 43 AN
ISSUE IN BRIEF 4 (Ctr. For Ret. Research at Boston Coll., Chestnut, Mass.) (Mar. 2006), availa-
ble at http://crr.bc.edulbriefs/401_k-plans-are-stillcomingup-short.html (click on the link for
full paper in PDF).
100. See generally Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98, at 611-12 (describing
the risk of benefit shortfalls inherent to 401(k) plans such as a lack of PBGC protection and
fiduciary liability on the part of the employer). See also Susan J. Stabile, Paternalism Isn't Al-
ways a Dirty Word: Can the Law Better Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?, 5 EMP.
RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 491, 498-501 (2001) ("Many defined contribution plan participants invest
too conservatively to ensure sufficient benefits at retirement-disproportionately investing in
fixed income alternatives").
101. Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98, at 628; see also Diversification Is
Key to Success of Section 401(k) Investments, ASPA Told, 17 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1243
(1990) [hereinafter Diversification] (discussing that insufficient financial training has been cited
most frequently as the explanation for why participants use overly conservative investment
strategies).
102. Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98, at 629.
103. See John R. Keville, Note, Retire at Your Own Risk: ERISA's Return on Investment?, 68
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 527, 545-46 (1994) ("The majority of self-directed pension plan investors
transferred funds to the stock market after it reached its high in 1987, and bailed out after the
market crashed soon thereafter").
104. See Regina T. Jefferson, The American Dream Savings Account: Is it a Dream or a
Nightmare?, in TAXING AMERICA 261 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
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benefit for the surviving spouse.'05 The equivalent form of payment
for an unmarried participant is a life annuity.
Life annuities guarantee periodic payments over the life of the
participant; consequently, they provide protection against unexpected
longevity. Although life expectancy tables can assist individuals in al-
locating sufficient assets to live comfortably throughout retirement,
the tables are inexact. There is substantial variation in life expectan-
cies among different groups relative to race, gender, and income.106
Therefore, predictors such as life expectancy tables and family history
are unreliable. For this reason, life annuities are the most effective
method by which individuals can allocate resources over the duration
of their lives and protect themselves against the risk of outliving their
assets.o 7 Accordingly, many economists maintain that life annuities
are an essential component of any properly structured retirement
portfolio. 0 8
Although the pension law requires defined benefit plans to offer
life annuities as an optional form of distribution, section 401(k) plans
are not required to do so.109 As a result, lump sum payments are the
105. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417(b) (2006). This benefit can be waived by the non-partici-
pating spouse. 26 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2) (2000); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1)(A)(1)(i) (2010) (al-
lowing spouse to waive interest in joint and survivor benefit); see I.R.C. 401(a)(11) (identifying
the normal form of payment for married participants as a qualified joint and survivor annuity
(QJSA)); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 91, at 580, 586; Leon I. Finkel & Hailee R. Bloom,
Changing Pension Beneficiaries After Divorce: It's More Important After Kennedy, 97 ILL. B.J.
462, 463 n.3 (2009) (discussing spouse's right to waive an interest in ERISA benefits).
106. See Jeffrey R. Brown, How Should We Insure Longevity Risk in Pensions and Social
Security?, 4 AN ISSUE IN BRIEF 5 (Ctr. For Ret. Research At Boston Coll., Chestnut, Mass.)
(Aug. 2000), available athttp://crr.bc.edulbriefs/how shouldweinsurelongevity-.risk in-pen-
sions and-socialsecurity_.html (Click on the link for full paper in PDF); see also NAT'L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTH, UNITED
STATES, 2008 WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON THE HEALTH OF YOUNG ADULTS 48 (2009), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus08.pdf#26. In 2005, "[a]mong men, life expectancy at age
65 [was] 17 years and among women ... 20 years." Life expectancy for those born in 2005 was
"75 years for men and 80 years for women[:] 76 years for white males compared with 70 years for
black males and 81 years for white females compared with 77 years for black females." Id.
107. See Brown, supra note 106, at 5 (describing difficulty of predicting life span). To illus-
trate the value of a life annuity, consider an individual who is age 65, owns significant assets and
is preparing for retirement. Further assume that this individual has no Social Security benefits,
no private pension payments, and no other source of income. Individual X desires to live in a
manner that will allow her to have sufficient assets to live comfortably for the duration of her
life. Obviously, if X knew her exact date of death and the rate of return on her investments, it
would be a relatively simple exercise to determine how much she should spend annually in order
not to deplete her assets before death. However, without this information it is difficult, if not
impossible, to allocate her wealth so as to achieve this goal. See id.
108. See Brown, supra, note 106, at 5, 16.
109. Cf 26 U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(9), (a)(11), (g) and 415(b) (2006) (regarding the obligation of a
defined benefit plan to offer annuities) with 26 U.S.C. § 401(k).
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most common form of distribution in 401(k) plans."o In 2008, only
one in five 401(k) plans offered plan participants the option of choos-
ing a life annuity at retirement. 1 '
It is possible for individuals receiving lump sum payments at re-
tirement to purchase life annuities independently in the commercial
market. However, this form of self-help can be prohibitively expen-
sive for low and moderate-income individuals. Life annuities pur-
chased in the commercial market by individuals typically are more
expensive than those offered to participants in qualified plans for two
reasons.112 One reason is that there are no "economies of scale"' 13
when individuals purchase life annuities independently. Thus, the
profit margins and administrative costs are higher in the commercial
market for independently purchased products.114
More importantly, because life annuities are most beneficial to
individuals who live beyond average life expectancies, companies sell-
ing life annuities assume that there is self-selection among those seek-
ing to purchase these products in the commercial market. Companies
further assume that those who purchase such products are in excellent
health and, based on predictors such as family history, expect to live
longer than average lives. These companies determine the cost and
payment levels for their products based upon these assumptions.
Therefore, the purchase of a life annuity independently in the com-
mercial market can impose a significant loss on low-income individu-
als because they have less disposable income and below-average life
expectancies." 5 As a result, it is reasonable for low-income retirees to
conclude that the reduction in their retirement benefits, necessary to
cover the costs and fees for a life annuity, would be better spent on
more pressing current expenditures. This is the case despite the fact
110. Immediate Income Annuities and Defined Contribution Plans, VANGUARD C-TR. FOR
RET. RESEARCH, (The Vanguard Group, Inc., Valley Forge, Pa.), May 2009, at 4 n.7 (collecting
studies reflecting annuity availability between 5% and 20%) available at https://institutional.
vanguard.com/iam/pdf/CRRADC.pdf. But see Accounting Web, More Employers Offering An-
nuities as Part of 401(k) Package, Dec. 22, 2009, http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/cfo/more-
employers-offering-annuities-part-401k-package (reporting a 22% offer rate).
111. See sources cited supra note 110.
112. PENSION SPONSORSHIP, supra note 68, at 30.
113. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, G-
2 (6th ed., Thompson South-Western 1994) (defining economies of scale as "savings that are
acquired through increases in quantities produced").
114. Id.
115. Monique Morrissey, Rich Man, Poor Man: The Life Expectancy Gap (Economic Policy
Institute), Jan. 16, 2008, available at http://www.epi.org/economic-snapshots/entry/webfeatures
snapshots20080116/.
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that life annuities provide valuable and highly recommended
protection.1 16
Life annuities not only solve the problem of unexpected longev-
ity, but also the problem of "leakage." Leakage refers to the use of
retirement funds for purposes other than retirement."' Section
401(k) plans provide lump sum payments when participants retire as
well as when they terminate employment prior to retirement.1 s
These early distributions allow individuals to spend their retirement
savings long before reaching retirement. Although the law permits
participants who receive pre-retirement lump sum distributions to roll
them over tax-free into other qualified retirement plans-or to
IRAs-most individuals who receive lump sum distributions from
their retirement plans do not reinvest them in this manner.119 In 2006
alone, retirement accounts lost $74 billion to lump-sum distributions
that were not reinvested.120
Data shows that the propensity to roll-over varies with the size of
the distribution.121 Distributions of larger amounts are more fre-
quently rolled over than distributions of smaller amounts. 122 Low-in-
116. See generally Jeffrey R. Brown, et al., Why Don't the People Insure Late Life Consump-
tion? A Framing Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle, 98:2 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. (forthcoming Jan. 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/-kling/framing.pdf (discussing
the perceived value of annuities).
117. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 401(K) PLANS: POLICY CHANGES COULD RE-
DUCE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE ON WORKERS' RETIREMENT SAVINGS GAO-09-
715, at 2 (2009), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d09715.pdf [hereinafter GAO 2009] (identi-
fying the "standard definition of leakage [as] participants tapping into their accrued retirement
savings prior to retirement").
118. GAO REPORT 1996, supra, note 90, at 1; see also Jefferson, Striking a Balance, supra
note 73, at 535-36.
Generally, tax qualified defined benefit plans are not permitted to make distributions
to employees while employment continues. Either at retirement, or at termination of
employment, defined benefit plans are permitted to make payments in the form of
lump sum distributions, or in a series of payments over a number of years. In contrast,
401(k) plans are permitted to make distributions of any amount, at anytime during
employment, provided the participant has attained the age of fifty-nine and a half, or in
the event the participant experiences financial hardship.
Id.
119. SATYENDRA VERMA & JULES LICHTENSTEIN, PENSION LUMp-Sum DISTRIBUTIONS: Do
BOOMERS TAKE THEM OR SAVE THEM? 3 (2006), available at http://www.aarp.org/research/ppil
econ-sec/pensions/articles/pensionlumpsumdistributions doboomers takethem or save_
them.html (follow "Data Digest (PDF)" hyperlink) (noting that in 2003, only 44% of those re-
ceiving lump sum distributions reinvested the distribution).
120. GAO 2009, supra note 117.
121. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CASH BALANCE PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RE-
TIREMENT INCOME, GAO/HEHS-00-207, at 31 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
2000/he00207.pdf.




come taxpayers are more likely to receive smaller distributions when
they terminate employment because the value of a participants ac-
count is typically a function of compensation and service.1 23 When
lump sum distributions are not reinvested in other retirement savings
instruments, it is far more likely that the funds will be used for non-
retirement purposes. As a result, there will be fewer remaining assets
to grow tax-free as retirement savings.
Historically, traditional defined benefit plans, second only to So-
cial Security, have been a significant source of annuity income to retir-
ees in this country. 124 Thus, an implication of the shift away from
defined benefit plans to section 401(k) plans as primary retirement
savings vehicles results in a decline in the availability of annuitized
benefit payments.
Therefore, at every stage of the retirement savings process, the
shift away from traditional defined benefit plans to 401(k) plans im-
poses greater risks on low and moderate-income workers. From the
decision of whether to make a contribution, to the determination of
how to allocate investments, to selections regarding the form of distri-
butions, low and moderate-income workers participating in the in-
creasingly popular 401(k) plans receive neither comparable benefits
nor adequate levels of retirement security.
3. The Lack of Insurance Protection in Defined Contribution Plans
Defined contribution plans, including 401(k) plans, are not in-
sured because there has been reluctance on the part of policymakers
to insure investment performance, as opposed to the calculable retire-
ment benefits in defined benefit plans.125 Due to this gap in insurance
protection, when market contractions occur close to retirement, par-
ticipants in defined contribution plans are more likely to experience
shortfalls in their retirement benefits than are participants in defined
benefit plans. However, the absence of guaranteed minimum benefits
has a greater impact on low and moderate-income workers because
123. See HEwrrr ASSOCIATES, supra note 94, at 11.
124. See What are Workers' Expected Major Sources of Retirement Income?, FAST FACTS
(Employee Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.) Apr. 23, 2009, http://www.ebri.org/pdfl
FFE120.23April09.Final.pdf; see also GAO Report 1996, supra note 90, at 6; Jefferson, Striking a
Balance, supra note 73, at 537.
125. See Jefferson, Defined Contribution Plans, supra note 98, at 617 (discussing absence of
insurance protection in defined contribution plans and how participants in defined benefits plans
are guaranteed a minimum investment return).
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they are less likely to have other assets to make up for investment
losses in their retirement accounts. 12 6
To protect themselves against such losses, individuals could ob-
tain insurance in the private market. Some insurance and mutual fund
companies sell a variety of products guaranteeing a minimum return
on certain investments for an annual fee. These instruments provide
protection against unexpected fluctuations in the market and other
risks that can threaten retirement security as well. 127
It would seem that reliance on self-help measures such as these
does not sufficiently advance the goal of providing retirement security
in the private retirement system. Many individuals may fail to obtain
protection through no fault of their own. Some employees, especially
low and moderate-income ones, may not adequately protect their re-
tirement savings against adverse market conditions because they do
not believe they can afford the premiums and fees, or they do not fully
recognize the value of such protection.128
The amount of insurance needed to adequately protect a retire-
ment account is difficult to determine and depends on unknown fac-
tors such as life expectancies, inflation, and investment return.
Therefore, many individuals may not be able to determine for them-
selves how much insurance they need, what a fair rate of return is, or
where to go to purchase such products. Accordingly, the trend of us-
ing defined contribution plans-401(k) plans in particular-as pri-
mary retirement savings vehicles has completely shifted the risk of
accumulating insufficient assets for retirement from the employer and
the federal government to the participant. This shift has a devastating
impact on the retirement security of low and moderate-income tax-
payers. In view of the cost and the objective of the private pension
system this result is inappropriate.
III. PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE INCREASED
RETIREMENT SECURITY TO LOW AND
MODERATE-INCOME WORKERS 12 9
The existing private retirement system favors high-income tax-
payers. The following proposal is designed to increase the participa-
126. Id. at 616.
127. Jefferson, Post-Enron Pension Reform, supra note 76, at 10-42.
128. Id.
129. See generally Regina Jefferson, Proposal presented at the Re-visioning Retirement
Security Conference (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.retirement-usa.org/about/re-envisioning-
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tion rate among low and moderate-income taxpayers in the private
retirement system and provide greater protection against benefit
losses to all participants. The proposal calls for insured universal per-
sonal retirement accounts, with the employee and employer making
equal contributions. Contributions for low and moderate-income in-
dividuals would be fully or partially subsidized by the government,
depending on their income levels. To the extent that the investments
of individual accounts conformed to prescribed portfolio parameters
for risk exposure, the accounts would be insured by the government
and receive a guaranteed minimum retirement benefit. The portfolio
parameters would limit the investment risk of individual accounts, but
at the same time allow competing investment institutions latitude in
portfolio design.130
There have been numerous proposals to encourage greater retire-
ment savings among low and moderate-income taxpayers. These pro-
posals have ranged from establishing universal retirement plans to
expanding the Saver's Credit. 3 ' However, the insurance program and
the portfolio parameters are the innovative aspects of this proposal.'32
The guarantee places a floor on the account balance received at retire-
ment from a defined contribution plan, based on an average rate of
return over a participant's working life. The primary idea of the insur-
ance proposal is to protect participants from severe losses that occur
close to retirement, when there is insufficient time for either market
corrections or the accumulation of additional personal savings to
retirement-security/proposals-for-a-new-retirement-system/ (follow "Insured Retirement
Accounts: Read more").
130. The insurance and the portfolio parameters are based on previous work suggesting an
optimal defined contribution insurance program for private sector plans. See Jefferson, supra
note 98. The primary idea underlying the insurance proposal is to protect individuals from se-
vere losses occurring close to retirement age.
131. For example, the Obama administration proposed both a refundable Saver's Credit and
automatic enrollment IRAs in its 2009 budget. Green Book, supra note 1, at 7. The Saver's
Credit proposal entails making "the saver's credit fully refundable and would provide for the
credit to be deposited automatically in the qualified retirement plan account or IRA to which
the eligible individual contributed." Id. The proposal also changes the "current 10%/20%/50%
credit for .. . contributions up to $2,000 per individual," to a 50% matching for the first $500. Id.
The administration also proposed that "[e]mployers in business for at least two years that have
10 or more employees ... be required to offer [either] an automatic IRA option to employees
on a payroll-deduction basis," or a qualified retirement plan. Id. at 8.
132. The insurance program and the portfolio parameters are based on previous work sug-
gesting an optimal defined contribution insurance program for private sector plans. See Jeffer-
son, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98, at 649-50; see also Retirement Security and Defined
Contribution Plans: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 77-84 (2002)
(statement of Regina T. Jefferson, Professor of Law, Catholic University of America Columbus
School of Law).
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make up the difference. The remaining portion of this article summa-
rizes the basic elements of the proposed universal retirement system,
and describes the key features of the proposed portfolio insurance
program to which the universal retirement system is connected.
A. Basic Elements of the Proposed Universal Retirement System
To ensure that all workers are covered by a private retirement
plan, this proposal mandates a universal private retirement system
that covers all employees to the extent of wages, up to a limit such as
the Social Security Contribution and Benefit Base.1 3 The program
would be funded by a combination of employer contributions, em-
ployee contributions, and a public subsidy for low and moderate-in-
come workers.
At the employer's election, contributions would be made to a
clearinghouse established within the Social Security Administrationl 34
or to an employer-sponsored qualified plan that provides guaranteed
benefits. The Social Security clearinghouse would offer the employer
a limited choice of pooled investment options, all of which would be
guaranteed. The clearinghouse also would be used to maintain bene-
fit records for the program. If the employer opted to contribute to an
employer sponsored plan rather than the clearinghouse, the plan
would have to be either an individual account plan with a guarantee
such as the one described below, or a qualified defined benefit plan.
The Mandatory Universal Pension System (MUPS), recom-
mended by the President's Commission on Pension Policy in 1981, was
similar in objective and required a 3% contribution.33 However, be-
cause this amount is unlikely to meet today's standards of adequacy,
this proposal requires a 6% contribution. 3 6 The levels of employer
133. The Social Security Contribution and Benefit Base are a result of the "Old-Age, Survi-
vors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program limit[ing] the amount of earnings subject to
taxation for a given year," the same limit that applies during benefit computation. Social Secur-
ity Online, Contribution and Benefit Base, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLA/cbb.
html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). The contribution and benefit base "generally increases [annu-
ally, in-line with] the national average wage index." Id. The base is $106,800 for 2010. Id.
134. Or to some other designated government entity, such as the PBGC.
135. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION PoL'Y, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL RE-
TIREMENT INCOME POLICY (1981).
136. See, e.g., North Carolina Dep't of State Treasurer, Determining an Adequate Replace-
ment Rate (2010), available at http://www.nctreasurer.com (search "Adequacy Executive Sum-
mary", then follow "Microsoft Word-Adequacy Executive Summary" hyperlink) (estimating
that "[flor an employee [making approximately $50,000] who decides to save for ... 45 years
until retirement at the age of 65, the savings rate need only be 10%" to provide for an adequate
replacement rate of 42.3% of his pre-retirement income).
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and government contributions would be determined by the worker's
income, with contributions phasing out as compensation increases be-
yond a certain level. For those compensated at the lowest levels-for
example, the minimum wage-the employer and government would
each be required to make a contribution of 3%, and no contribution
would be required by the employee. All contributions would be guar-
anteed and include the cost of insurance. After an employee's com-
pensation reached a certain level, the employee would be required to
contribute the full 6% minimum, including the cost of the insurance
premiums. Employees wanting to contribute beyond the minimum
could do so, up to a limit, entirely at their own expense, including the
cost of the insurance premium.
In order to mitigate costs, the program could be phased-in over a
period of time. Furthermore, to prevent undue burdens, the employer
contribution could be waived for small employers.' However, all
employers regardless of size would be required to facilitate govern-
ment and employee contributions to the clearinghouse.
B. Key Features of the Proposed Insurance Program
The proposed insurance program establishes a risk-based, gov-
ernment sponsored insurance program covering all defined contribu-
tion plans.138 The insurance protection described in this proposal is
not a guaranteed annual investment return. Rather, the proposed
program guarantees a minimum investment return over the working
life of a plan participant. The guaranteed minimum benefit is de-
signed specifically to protect a participant against the negative effects
of severe market contractions immediately before retirement. Thus,
in the event that the market takes a sudden downturn, a participant
planning to retire would receive a minimum retirement benefit re-
gardless of her actual account balance.
137. The Department of Labor records pension statistics based upon plans with 100 or more
participants versus participants with less than 100 participants. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF LA-
BOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN His-
TORICAL TABLES (2008). However, in 2004, 36% of U.S. employees were employed by firms
with less than one hundred employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS ABOUT BUSINESS
SIZE (INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESSES) FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU TBL.2A, available at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html. Excluding employers with fewer than ten or
twenty employees would be more appropriate, as that would exempt employer contributions on
behalf of only 11% or 18% of employees, respectively. Id.
138. For a more detailed and developed discussion of the insurance portion of this proposal,
see Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98.
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1. Use of the Diversification Standard
The proposed program hinges on the use of a prescribed diversifi-
cation standard. The diversification standard defines an acceptable
range of complementary allocations with respect to both investment
categories and risk classifications. The standard is designed to ap-
proximate an average rate of return for accounts invested in average
risk investment instruments, over a participant's working life. To the
extent that a participant's insured account complied with the pre-
scribed diversification standard, the account would be protected
against the risk of earning less than average investment returns over
an employee's career. In connection with the diversification standard,
it would be necessary to develop an indexing system to evaluate all
investment funds and assign a risk factor to them.
2. Calculation of the Minimum Guaranteed Benefit
An individual's minimum guaranteed benefit would equal the an-
nual employer contributions multiplied by the annual guaranteed
rates of investment return for each year of employment. Each year's
guaranteed rate of return would be based on the performance of a
hypothetical portfolio, assumed to be in compliance with the pre-
scribed diversification standard. The annual guaranteed rate of return
would equal the average of the annual rates of return for the hypo-
thetical account, over the prior five years. To diffuse the impact of
sudden market fluctuations, the five-year average is used rather than
the performance of a single year. This calculation protects both the
participant and the insurer against sudden market fluctuations.
The insured benefit would be determined by comparing a partici-
pant's actual account balance at retirement age to the hypothetical
account balance at retirement. The hypothetical account balance
would be determined by using the annual guaranteed rates of return
for each year of employment prior to retirement. Thus, the annual
guaranteed rates of return effectively establish a floor for the portfo-
lio, below which the retirement benefit would not fall. Accordingly, if
the insured portion of a participant's actual account balance fell short
of the hypothetical account balance, the insurer would pay the differ-
ence. If the participant's actual account balance exceeded the hypo-




3. Form and Time of Distribution
The insured benefit would be payable in the form of a life annuity
for single participants, and a Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuity for
married participants. The benefit would be paid only at retirement
age or disability. The retirement age used for this purpose could track
the Social Security retirement ages, and could provide for early retire-
ment at age sixty-two. Even if the plan provided for distributions
prior to retirement (including loans), there would be no insurance
protection available for such events. The restriction against pre-re-
tirement withdrawals not only protects the participant's account
against leakage, but also protects the insurer by preventing a single
event in the financial market from increasing the volume of insured
claims at a given moment as occurred in the savings and loan crisis. 139
The insured benefit is based on normal retirement age. There-
fore, if an individual worked beyond retirement age, the insured
retirement benefit would be unaffected by post-retirement-age contri-
butions. However, because the insured benefit would be payable as
an annuity, there could be upward adjustments to the benefit for the
delay in the annuity starting date. Accordingly, the post retirement
age contributions would enhance the annuity, but would not be cov-
ered by the insurance program.
4. Structure and Cost of Insurance Premium
Unlike the premium for PBGC insurance, the premium for the
proposed program would be risk-based and economically derived.
140
139. See Jefferson, Rethinking the Investment, supra note 98, at 667 n.270.
The savings and loan problem began in 1980 when interest rate legislation was passed
which deregulated the liabilities (i.e., deposits), but not the assets of the savings and
loan. Soon after, federal tax incentives were introduced in 1981 and 1982 which en-
couraged real estate projects to be undertaken that were not economically viable. Dur-
ing the same time, the federal government tightened the money supply, which caused
government bond interest rates to rise. This situation forced the savings and loans to
seek higher short-term rates through junk bonds. Making matters worse, in 1986 oil
plunged to $10 a barrel, and the income tax incentives were taken away with no grand-
father provisions. Also, one year later the stock market plummeted, and finally in 1989
the Financial Institution's Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) im-
posed higher capital standards on the thrift industry, creating a situation in which more
savings and loan institutions had to be seized by the government than had been
anticipated.
Id.; see also Yakoboski et al., PBGC Solvency: Balancing Social and Casualty Insurance Perspec-
tives, 126 EMPL. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF 18 (1992).
140. Instead, the PBGC has flat-rate premiums. For 2010, the rates are $35 per participant
for single-employer defined benefit plans and $9 per participant for multi-employer defined ben-
efit plans. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 2010 PREMIUM PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS 23
(2010), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2010_comprehensive-booklet.pdf#page=3.
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Premiums should be less expensive than they would be if the insurer
were private because the government could treat the insurance pro-
gram as a revenue neutral activity. The level of insurance protection
and the cost of the insurance premium would depend on the degree to
which the participant's allocation complied with the diversification
standard. In order for an account to be fully insurable at the regular
premium rate, the participant's account could not be exposed to an
investment risk greater than that of the prescribed diversification stan-
dard. Thus, the diversification standard resolves the moral hazard
problem by placing limitations on the level of risk to which an insured
account could be exposed.141
CONCLUSION
The tax subsidy for the private retirement system is one of the
country's most costly special tax programs. One of the primary objec-
tives of the private retirement system is to encourage individuals who
would not, or could not, save on their own to do so. Notwithstanding
the size and cost of the retirement program, nearly one-half of the
nation's workforce is not covered by a private retirement plan.142
Those who do participate in such plans disproportionately represent
individuals from the highest income brackets. These facts suggest that
the existing retirement system is characterized by a redistribution of
wealth from low-income individuals, who often have no private retire-
ment benefits, to high-income individuals who maintain private retire-
ment benefits. These facts also suggest that the existing retirement
system has not been successful in accomplishing its primary goal.
In recent years, the shift from using defined benefit plans as pri-
mary retirement savings vehicles to 401(k) plans has caused even
greater variance among taxpayers in different income groups regard-
ing plan participation and the receipt of the tax benefits associated
with such programs. As a consequence, rather than encouraging low
and moderate-income taxpayers to save, these plans have increased
the regressive effect of the overall retirement system. In addition, the
141. A moral hazard is "a hazard that has its inception in mental attitudes ... [such as the]
risk that an insured will destroy property or allow it to be destroyed (usu. by burning) in order to
collect the insurance proceeds...." BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Westlaw). Thus,
the tendency of insurance to encourage the source of risk creates a moral hazard problem and
presents challenges for designing insurance protection.
142. See RETIREMENT PLAN PARTICIPATION, supra note 67, at 4 (explaining that in 2006,




risk allocation in participant directed 401(k) plans disfavors low-in-
come workers and diminishes both the value of their retirement sav-
ings and the benefits that they ultimately receive. Unless corrective
measures are taken, the increasing popularity of 401(k) plans will
serve only to enlarge the disparity of retirement security between high
and low-income taxpayers.
Accordingly, additional steps should be taken to ensure greater
participation among low and moderate-income taxpayers in the ex-
isting private retirement system and to provide greater protection
against the risk that use of certain plans as primary retirement savings
vehicles presents. These measures are necessary not only to justify the
tax expenditure of the retirement program, but also to accomplish its
intended purpose.
The universal private retirement system described in Part III of
this article is aimed at achieving universal coverage and greater secur-
ity in the private retirement system by combining a mandatory univer-
sal retirement system with a defined contribution insurance program.
The universal retirement system provides a subsidy to low and moder-
ate-income taxpayers that phases out as income rises above a certain
level. The insurance program protects participants against the risks of
plan losses and benefit erosion resulting from market contractions,
unexpected longevity, and current consumption. As a result, this pro-
gram would significantly improve both the equity and effectiveness of
the private retirement system in particular, and the overall tax system
in general.
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